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MacaqueMovies, vacations, and meals are all examples of events composed of a sequence of smaller
events. How do we go from our evaluations of each scene in a movie to an evaluation of the
sequence as a whole? In theory, we should simply average the values of the individual
events. In practice, however, we are biased towards sequences where each element tends
to be better than the previous, where the last value is large, and we overweight the best (or
worst) part of the sequence. To study how general these biases are we examined monkeys’
preferences for sequences of rewards in a novel reward repeat task. Monkeys were ﬁrst
given a sequence of rewards and then chose between repeating the sequence or receiving
a standard comparator sequence. We found that, like humans, monkeys overweight events
that happen later in a sequence, so much so that adding a small reward to the end of a
sequence can paradoxically reduce its value. Monkeys were also biased towards sequences
with large peak values (the highest value in the sequence), but only following a working
memory challenge, suggesting that this preference may be driven by memory limitations.
These results demonstrate the cross-species nature of biases in preferences for sequences
of outcomes. In addition, monkeys’ consistent preference for sequences in which large val-
ues occur later challenges the generality of discounting models of intertemporal choice in
animals.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Wemust often evaluate experiences that occur over ex-
tended periods of time and involve a mix of reward inten-
sities and valences (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993). Forexample, how much did we enjoy a speciﬁc two-hour mo-
vie, three-course meal, or seven-day vacation? And how
much would we pay for another similar sequence? To
make these evaluations, we must mentally combine the
utilities of multiple individual moments into a single value.
In theory we should just sum the experienced utilities of
the constituent events – the order of events occur should
not matter. How much we feel we have enjoyed a movie
should just be a function of how much we enjoyed each
scene individually. However, human and animal decision-
makers typically discount rewards as an increasing func-
tion of delay (Rachlin, 2004). One would expect, then, that
we would prefer sequences with the highest valued events
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wenstein & Prelec, 1993), meaning a movie with a strong
start would be preferred to one with a strong ending.
Common sense dictates that the overall utility of an
experience is the sum (or average) utility of its compo-
nents. Discounting models predict that, because we prefer
rewards sooner rather than later, we should invariably pre-
fer declining sequences to improving ones that are
matched for average value. Contrary to both of these, hu-
mans often prefer sequences to increase in value over time
(Ariely, 1998; Chapman, 1996; Chapman, 2000; Frank &
Hutchens, 1993; Hsee, Abelson, & Salovey, 1991; Hsee &
Abelson, 1991; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993; Loewenstein
& Sicherman, 1991; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991; Ross &
Simonson, 1991). Closely related biases motivate us to va-
lue sequences in which the more positive events occurred
near the end (the end bias), sequences with greater peak
intensities regardless of when they occur (the peak bias),
and sequences with increasing reward intensity (the trend
bias) (Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier,
1993; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993; Redelmeier & Kahn-
eman, 1996). That is, we would expect that people over-
weight the best scene and ending of a movie when
reporting how much they enjoyed the ﬁlm. Together, these
biases are a deﬁning feature of our intertemporal prefer-
ences. These preference patterns apply to positive and
aversive domains, have been conﬁrmed in ﬁeld studies,
and may be harnessed to improve health and welfare
(Clark & Georgellis, 2004; Do, Rupert, & Wolford, 2008;
Kahneman, 1999; Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996; Red-
elmeier, Katz, & Kahneman, 2003). So robust are these ef-
fects that merely reframing rewards as being part of a
sequence rather than independent events can cause a
switch in preference from decreasing towards increasing
sequences (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993). Together, these
results pose a major challenge to standard theories about
temporal allocation of rewards and suggest that psycho-
logical factors can overwhelm discounting preferences in
intertemporal choice (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donog-
hue, 2002).
Understanding animal economic preferences provides
an important point of comparison with human economic
preferences (Real, 1991; Stevens & Stephens, 2010). Stud-
ies of animals economic preferences in the laboratory have
provided a great deal of information about the cognitive
processes they use to make decisions, giving us insight into
the mental lives of animals (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003;
Brosnan et al., 2007; Chen, Lakshminarayanan, & Santos,
2006; Egan, Bloom, & Santos, 2010). We know almost noth-
ing about how animals evaluate sequences of rewards (but
see Xu, Knight, & Kralik, 2011). The well-established steep
discounting observed across taxa would predict that ani-
mals strongly prefer decreasing sequences to ﬂat ones
and ﬂat ones to increasing ones.
We studied the preferences of three rhesus monkeys in
a simple sequence preference task. Rhesus monkeys offer
an ideal model organism for studying intertemporal pref-
erences – their psychology is well studied, they are ﬂexible
learners that do not readily fall into behavioral stereoty-
pies, and they have time preferences that are similar to
those of other animals (Glimcher, Kable, & Louie, 2007;Kim, Hwang, & Lee, 2008; Stevens, Rosati, Ross, & Hauser,
2005). On each trial of our novel reward repeat task, mon-
keys were given a sequence of ﬁve rewards and then of-
fered a choice between repeating that sequence or
obtaining a well-learned comparator sequence consisting
of ﬁve repeats of a single value (either [2.22.22.22.22.2],
[33333], [3.43.43.43.43.4], or [44444]). We then esti-
mated a subjective value for each probe sequence by ﬁtting
a preference function.
We found that monkeys assign more decision weight to
events later in the sequence. Indeed, the addition of a small
reward at the end of a sequence can, paradoxically, reduce
its value (cf. Kahneman et al., 1993; Schreiber &
Kahneman, 2000). These results are reminiscent of those
observed in humans and suggest that similar heuristics
are employed by humans and monkeys in guiding choices
over extended sequences. Unlike humans, monkeys did not
prefer sequences with large peaks in the standard version
of our task, although we induced a peak bias in monkeys
by adding a weak working memory challenge (a four sec-
ond delay preceding choice). Collectively, these results
highlight the potential importance of memory in driving
preferences and challenge discounting models of animal
intertemporal preferences.2. Methods
2.1. Behavioral task
Trials were randomly chosen from a larger set of possi-
ble sequences and interleaved. We collected about twice as
much data from subject H as from subjects J and K. The
amount of data collected was determined by subject and
experimenter availability and was not in any way deter-
mined by examining data. No subjects were excluded from
the study. Our computer monitor had a 1024  768 resolu-
tion and was placed 144.8 cm (57 in.) in front of the
subjects.
Each trial of the task consisted of three steps:
Step 1, probe reward: The probe cue appeared (a photo-
graph of some rocks, see Fig. 1). After 500 ms, a sequence of
ﬁve ﬂuid rewards was given, each separated from the next
by 500 ms. The duration of the rewards ranged from 20 ms
to 80 ms. The time required to give the reward did not slow
down the delivery of the next reward. The identity of the
rewards varied with task condition (see below). When
the number zero appears in a sequence, this indicates no
reward was given but a 500 ms delay still occurred. In
the one four-step sequence [2228], no delay was imposed
at the end. In theworking memory challenge variant of the
task, a four-second delay was added at the end of the probe
reward period and before the choice; the monitor was kept
blank during this time. Note that, for ease of description,
values are normalized to a standard value of 1 = 0.01 mL.
Step 2, choice: Following a 500 ms delay, two targets
appeared, centered 16.5 degrees of visual angle to the left
and right of the central spot. The probe stimulus consisted
of the same neutral photographic stimulus that appeared
in Step 1 (the picture of rocks). The comparator stimulus
consisted of a solid colored vertically oriented rectangle
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Fig. 1. Schematic of the design of the reward-repeat task. (A) Stimuli used. On each trial, subjects chose between a probe stimulus (left image) and one of
four different standard stimuli (four colored squares, right). Reward units are multiples of 10 lL. (B and C) Timeline of task, two examples. On each trial,
subjects were initially presented with a sequence of 5 ﬂuid rewards; each element was separated by 0.5 s; the probe stimulus image appeared centrally on
the computer monitor during this time. Then, following a brief delay (0.5 s), the probe stimulus and one standard stimulus appeared on the left and right of
the ﬁxation spot (sides were randomized on each trial). (B) Selection of the probe led to a repeat of the probe sequence and (C) selection of the standard led
to the appropriate standard sequence. Inter-trial interval was 1 s.
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(orange, yellow, gray, or blue) indicating the associated re-
ward size. Choice of the comparator offered one a sequence
of ﬁve repeats of the same size (2.2, 3.0, 3.4, and 4.0,
respectively). The side on which the probe and comparator
were shown was chosen randomly on each trial. Monkeys
made their choice by shifting gaze to the chosen target.
Step 3, reward: 500 ms following the monkeys’ choice,
the chosen reward was given. Choice of the probe offered
an immediate repeat of the sequence that was given in
Step 1. After that, an inter-trial interval of 1 s occurred.
2.2. Training
All three subjects were previously extensively trained
to perform simple decision making tasks involving making
saccades to targets for rewards. Two of the subjects (H and
J) performed, among other tasks, intertemporal choice
tasks; the other subject (K) did not. All three subjects were
familiar with the mappings between colors and reward
size, which are maintained across all tasks within the lab.
Training involved a stepwise series of tasks building to-
wards the standard task. Subjects were required to be
trained for at least 2 weeks, and were not allowed to begin
data collection until they were able to perform a simpliﬁed
version of the task at 75% accuracy for three days in a row.
(This simpliﬁed version involved four uniform sequences
equal to the standard sequences; accuracy in this version
was choosing the option, probe or comparator, with thelarger total reward.) In practice, all three subjects took
about two weeks to meet this criterion.
2.3. Statistics
Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA) was used for all com-
putations. The point of subjective equivalence (PSE) was
computed by ﬁtting a sigmoidal curve to the preference
data and then computing the point where this curve
crossed the indifference (i.e. 50% choice) line (similar
methods were used in Hayden, Parikh, Deaner, & Platt,
2007 and Hayden et al., 2007). Standard errors were esti-
mated using a jackknife method (as in Hayden et al.,
2007). Speciﬁcally, we repeated the calculation of PSE on
a subset of 95% of the data, randomly selected. Then we re-
peated this procedure 20 times, using different random
sets (without replacement) and used these 20 estimates
to compute the standard error. The jackknife standard
deviation was deﬁned as the standard error multiplied by
the square root of 20.
Computing whether ordered variables have a signiﬁcant
effect on computed variables like PSE presents a special
problem for analysis because we cannot use simple linear
regression (we are referring here to the analyses shown
in Figs. 2C and 3A–C). We therefore devised a novel statis-
tical technique using a bootstrap methodology, which we
refer to above as a bootstrap permutation test. We ﬁrst
performed a random statistical resampling of the dataset
(with replacement) to generate a resampled version of
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Fig. 2. Basic preference data for all three monkeys for ﬂat sequences. (A) Average proportion of trials on which monkeys chose each of four ﬂat sequences
(i.e. sequences with ﬁve repeats of the same value). Data are averaged across the four standard stimuli. Monkeys chose larger valued sequences more often,
conﬁrming that their behavior was sensible. Error bars indicate standard error. (B) Plot of proportion chosen for the probe sequence [3.23.23.23.23.2] as a
function of the four different comparator sequences (red dots). Monkeys were more likely to choose higher valued comparators. Black line indicates best-ﬁt
sigmoidal curve. Blue line highlights the point of subjective equivalence (PSE), our model estimate of the value at which the monkey was indifferent to the
probe and comparator. The PSE provides an estimate of the decision utility assigned to the probe sequence. (C) Plot of the PSE for each of the four ﬂat probe
sequences shown in panel A. PSE rose with probe value and was in all cases about 0.8 ﬂuid units greater than the comparator value. Error bars indicate
standard error and are calculated by a jackknife procedure (see Section 2.3). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 3. Preferences of three monkeys for ordered sequences. (A) Monkeys assign greater value to increasing sequences than to ﬂat sequences or decreasing
sequences, even when total intake is matched. (B) Preference for large value at the end of the sequence is maintained even when small values are zeros (no
reward). (C) Monkeys assign greater value to sequences with a single large value the later it is in the sequence. In all cases, error bars indicate standard error
as computed by jackknife (see Section 2.3).
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puted the PSE for each of the elements of this resampled
distribution and then calculated the slope of the best-ﬁt
line through these points. We then repeated this process
20,000 times and counted the proportion of times the slope
crossed over zero. We multiplied this proportion by two
(because we wanted to get a two-tailed t-test) to estimate
the p-value for the claim.2.4. Subjects
All procedures were approved by the University of
Rochester Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee
and were designed and conducted in compliance with
the Public Health Service’s Guide for the Care and Use of
Animals. Three male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)
served as subjects. Initially, each animal was provided with
a small mount to facilitate head positioning using standard
techniques (Blanchard, Pearson, & Hayden, 2013). Subjects
were habituated to laboratory conditions and trained to
perform decision tasks for liquid reward. Standard rein-
forcement training was used with only positive ﬂuidrewards; punishment was never used, nor was aversive
conditioning.3. Results
On each trial of our novel reward repeat task (Fig. 1),
monkeys ﬁrst experienced a sequence of ﬁve liquid re-
wards (probe sequence) and then immediately chose be-
tween two options: (a) repeating the probe sequence of
rewards, (b) taking one of four standard comparator se-
quences. The probe sequence is chosen randomly each trial
from a larger set of possible sequences (the larger set of se-
quences is determined by the experimental condition). For
ease of description in this manuscript, all juice volumes are
normalized to a standard value of 1 aliquot = 0.01 mL.
Comparator sequences consisted of ﬁve repeats of a single
value (either 2.2, 3, 3.4, or 4), were well-learned during
training, were explicitly cued by color, and varied ran-
domly each trial. By ﬁtting a sigmoidal curve to preference
as a function of probe sequence value, we estimated a sub-
jective value for each probe sequence (Hayden, Heilbron-
ner, & Platt, 2010; Hayden et al., 2007) (see Section 2.3).
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behavioral coherence
We ﬁrst examined monkeys’ evaluation of probe se-
quences consisting of ﬁve identical options. Fig. 2A shows
the average frequency of choices for each sequence
([22222], [3.23.23.23.23.2], [3.63.63.63.63.6], and
[44444]) against the four comparator sequences
[2.22.22.22.22.2], [33333], [3.43.43.43.43.4], and
[44444]. Monkeys choose the greater valued sequence
more often than the less valued ones (regression of prefer-
ence against probe value, b = 0.10, p = 0.0002). The same
patterns are observed for each monkey individually (sub-
ject H: b = 0.11, p = 0.02; subject J: b = 0.09, p = 0.01; sub-
ject K: b = 0.07, p = 0.04). We next examined the
inﬂuence of session by treating it as a random effect in a
multi-variable ANOVA (subject  sequence  session). We
found no inﬂuence of session (p = 0.1374, DF = 36, sum of
squares = 7.306, F = 1.26) or of subject (p = 0.173, DF = 2,
sum of squares = 0.549, F = 1.76), although we did ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant effect of sequence (p = 0.0003, DF = 3, sum of
squares = 3.003, F = 6.41).
To determine the value placed on each sequence, we
next estimated the point of subjective equivalence (PSE)for
each sequence (illustrated in Fig. 2B). To do so, we sepa-
rated choices by the value of the standard comparator.
Data for the probe sequence [3.23.23.23.23.2] are shown
in Fig. 2B; the four comparators appear on the x-axis. We
then ﬁt the data to a sigmoidal curve. We deﬁned the
PSE as the point where this sigmoidal curve crosses the
indifference line (i.e. 50% choice of probe and 50% choice
of standard), indicating equal valuation of the two options.
The PSE provides an estimate of the subjective value placed
on the sequence of options in terms of the value of the
standard comparators. The PSE for this sequence was 4.0
(±0.43 standard error), indicating that monkeys treated
this sequence as if it had a value equivalent to [44444].
The difference between this decision value for a se-
quence and its actual value, 0.8 (for each element in the se-
quence), provides a measure of monkeys’ intrinsic
preference for the probe option vs. the comparator. This
probe premium was roughly constant for all four uniform
sequences used in Experiment 1 and for each of the three
monkeys. Indeed, we found no relationship between the
probe premium and probe value (we used a novel boot-
strap slope test for this analysis, see Section 2.3; we abbre-
viate slope as m, m = 0.023, p = 0.55). Our data do not
provide any information about why the probe sequences
were preferred to the comparators; we speculate that this
difference may reﬂect a preference for variable, novel, or
informative options (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009;
Hayden, Heilbronner, Nair, & Platt, 2008; Heilbronner &
Hayden, 2013).
Fig. 2C shows the PSE for all four probe sequences used
in Experiment 1, [22222], [3.23.23.23.23.2],
[3.63.63.63.63.6], and [44444]. Not surprisingly, we
found a clear monotonic relationship between probe value
and decision value. We observed a signiﬁcant positive rela-
tionship between probe value and PSE for the group of
three monkeys and for each monkey individually (using
the bootstrap slope test). Speciﬁcally, m = 0.9 (units forslope are aliquots per trial divided by a categorical dummy
variable), p < 0.0001 for the group of monkeys (subject H:
m = 1.1, p < 0.0001; subject J: m = 0.7, p = 0.0009; subject
K: m = 0.55, p = 0.033). Together these data indicate that
monkeys have no trouble understanding the task. These
data also indicate that monkeys have well-behaved, sys-
tematic preferences over the options and a clear preference
for the probe over the comparator option.3.2. Monkeys prefer sequences with large rewards at the end
We next examined how monkeys evaluate increasing,
ﬂat, and decreasing sequences (Fig. 3A). We ﬁrst examined
the rising sequence [12346], the ﬂat sequence
[3.23.23.23.23.2], and the falling sequence [64321].
These three sequences, as well as most used in this study,
have the same total value (16). We found a clear preference
for the increasing sequence (bootstrap t-test, p < 0.0001 for
the group, p < 0.0001 for H, p < 0.001 for J and K) and a
clear preference for the ﬂat sequence over the decreasing
one (p < 0.008 for the group, and p = 0.012 for H,
p = 0.015 for J and p = 0.029 for K). Thus monkeys prefer se-
quences to increase in value rather than decrease. These
preferences are inconsistent with discounting theories,
which predict preference for decreasing sequences, and
are reminiscent of human preferences for increasing se-
quences (Ariely, 1998; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993).
We next examined the inﬂuence of session by treating it
as a random effect in a multi-variable ANOVA (sub-
ject  sequence  session) on the raw preference data
(not the PSE ﬁt data). We found no inﬂuence of session
(p = 0.3805, DF = 36, sum of squares = 7.533, F = 1.06) or
of subject (p = 0.4791, DF = 2, sum of squares = 0.284,
F = 0.74).
We then examined the effect of position on preference
(Fig. 3B). We tested ﬁve reward sequences [82222],
[28222], [22822], [22282], and [22228]. These se-
quences are identical except for the temporal position of
the large reward. We found a clear and roughly linear in-
crease in value for sequences with later positioning of
the large reward. Speciﬁcally we found values of m = 0.08
(units for slope are aliquots per trial divided by a categor-
ical dummy variable), p < 0.0001 for the group (subject H:
m = 0.083, p < 0.0001; subject J:m = 0.096, p = 0.01; subject
K:m = 0.062, p = 0.01). These data conﬁrm that the order in
which options are presented matters to monkeys in deter-
mining preference, and that larger rewards presented later
in the sequence are preferred to larger rewards sooner.
This pattern of preferences is consistent with the prefer-
ence for increasing sequences observed in humans and is
somewhat consistent with the end bias (Ariely, 1998;
Kahneman et al., 1993; Schreiber & Kahneman, 2000).
We next examined the possible confounding factor of
session and/or subject by treating them as a random effect
in a multi-variable ANOVA (subject  sequence  session)
on the raw preference data (not the PSE ﬁt data). We found
no inﬂuence of session (p = 0.6111, DF = 36, sum of
squares = 6.43, F = 0.92) or of subject (p = 0.8103, DF = 2,
sum of squares = 0.08, F = 0.21). We thus infer that se-
quence order was the critical factor.
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attempt to rate maximize, as including a delay (zero) does not signiﬁ-
cantly reduce preference.
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the discounting hypothesis, that monkeys steeply discount
future rewards over the course of a few seconds (Rachlin,
2004). This hypothesis predicts that monkeys should inev-
itably prefer decreasing sequences (Frederick, Loewen-
stein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). However, the intertemporal
choice tasks that are used to support the discounting
hypothesis generally use single rewards. Thus it is possible
that monkeys show anti-discounting behavior in our re-
ward repeat task because of some bias caused by multiple
rewards. To test this idea, we examined valuations for
three sequences, [80000], [00800], and [00008]
(Fig. 3C). Zeros here correspond to half-second periods
with no reward (or any other novel cue). Again, we found
a clear pattern of preferences for large reward later. Specif-
ically, we found a signiﬁcant effect of position on value
using the bootstrap permutation test, m = 0.12, p < 0.0004
for the group (subject H: p = 0.006; subject J: p = 0.04; sub-
ject K: p = 0.011). Interestingly, the probe premium for
these sequences (roughly 2.0 across animals and condi-
tions) was greater than that observed for other, more valu-
able sequences (about 0.8, as noted above). Within the
hyperbolic discounting framework, the present results
can only be accounted for by a negative discount factor k
(that is, rewards are more valuable when delayed than
when immediate). Because our monkeys have positive ks
in standard discounting tasks (Blanchard et al., 2013), we
surmise that the discounting parameter measured by
intertemporal choice tasks may have poor external valid-
ity, as suggested by earlier work (Bateson & Kacelnik,
1996; Blanchard et al., 2013; Pavlic & Passino, 2010; Pear-
son, Hayden, & Platt, 2010; Stephens & Anderson, 2001).
We next examined the possible confounding factor of
session and/or subject by treating them as a random effect
in a multi-variable ANOVA (subject  sequence  session)
on the raw preference data (not the PSE ﬁt data). We found
no inﬂuence of session (p = 0.9645 DF = 36, sum of
squares = 5.002, F = 0.62) or of subject (p = 0.733, DF = 2,
sum of squares = 0.136, F = 0.31).
3.3. Paradoxical effect of adding a small reward
Human studies have shown that adding a punisher to
the end of a sequence of negative events can, paradoxically,
increase preference for that sequence if the punisher is less
aversive than earlier events (Schreiber & Kahneman, 2000).
For example, holding one’s hand in a bucket of 14 water
for one minute and then an additional 30 s while the water
is raised to 15 (still unpleasant but less so) is generally
preferred to the one minute 14 water event alone (Kahn-
eman et al., 1993). Similar effects have been observed with
positive experiences (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993;
Shizgal, 1999). We therefore wondered whether adding a
small reward to the end of a sequence might decrease pref-
erence for it.
We thus next compared valuations for the sequences
[2228] and [22281] (Fig. 4). Because the ﬁrst sequence
had one fewer element and was therefore 500 ms shorter,
we were concerned that monkeys might choose it in order
to hasten the beginning of the next trial and increase re-
ward intake rate (Blanchard et al., 2013). We thereforeadded another condition with the same timing as the
[22281] sequence, [22280]. We found that monkeys pre-
ferred [2228] and [22280] to [22281], despite the fact
that the sequence [22281] offers more total reward (15
vs. 14). These effects are signiﬁcant (bootstrap permuta-
tion test, p = 0.004 for the subjects together, p < 0.05 for
each of the three subjects individually). We found no sig-
niﬁcant difference in preference between [2228] and
[22280], suggesting that timing does not contribute
strongly to preferences in this condition (bootstrap permu-
tation test, p = 0.18 for the group of three subjects, p > 0.05
for each of the individual subjects).
We can also look at the sequence [22282] from the ear-
lier section. The PSE for this sequence (4.11) was signiﬁ-
cantly lower than the PSE for [2228] (4.2, bootstrap
permutation test, p = 0.044). These results indicate that
even increasing a sequence’s value by 2 (that is, by about
14% of the value of the original sequence) is not enough
to overcome the reduction in preference induced by ending
with a lower value in this context.
It is not clear why the sequence [22280] is not treated
as a sequence with a very low end value. We conjecture
that the single zero at the end of [22280] may be more
readily ignored than the two and four zeroes at the end
of the other one-element sequences.
3.4. Later elements in the sequence have greater inﬂuence on
evaluations
Taken together, these data indicate that, within the con-
text of this task, monkeys prefer sequences with increasing
values and that they are particularly motivated by large
values at the end of a sequence. One possible explanation
for these data is that monkeys place more weight on items
later in the sequence. To test this idea, we next measured
valuations in a random sequence variant of the reward re-
peat task. In this version of the task, every element of every
sequence on every trial was chosen at random by the com-
puter. Rewards in each of the ﬁve steps of the sequence
were 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. (Random selection was made with
replacement, so it was possible for the same element to
reappear, and sequence average values were not
constrained).
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tion 2.3) against reward value in each position, which were
independent of each other (Fig. 5). We found that monkeys’
regression coefﬁcients increase roughly linearly with step
number. Speciﬁcally, we found a signiﬁcant increase in
regression coefﬁcient with step number for the group
(bootstrap permutation test, p < 0.0001) and for each mon-
key individually (p < 0.0001 for H, p = 0.006 for J and
p = 0.044 for K). These effects indicate that the size of the
reward later in the sequence has a greater effect on prefer-
ence than the size of the reward earlier in the sequence.
We next examined the possible confounding factor of
session and/or subject by treating them as a random effect
in a multi-variable ANOVA (subject  sequence  session)
on the raw preference data (not the PSE ﬁt data). We found
no inﬂuence of session (p = 0.7476 DF = 6, sum of
squares = 0.673, F = 0.58) or of subject (p = 0.4171, DF = 2,
sum of squares = 0.339, F = 0.88).
3.5. Peak bias and working memory challenge
Besides the end bias and preference for improving se-
quences, humans have a pronounced peak bias. That is,
we often prefer sequences with a single large value to ones
with a higher total value but a smaller peak (Do et al.,
2008). We observed no evidence of peak biases in our data.
Fig. 6A shows the relative preferences for three sequences
with the same average value but different peak levels:
[22822], [23532], and [24442]. These sequences have
identical end values and the same slope (i.e. no overall in-
crease). Indeed, we found a signiﬁcant preference for ﬂat-
ter sequences for the group and for two of the three
monkeys individually. Speciﬁcally a bootstrap permutation
test showed m = 0.35, p < 0.004 for the group (subject H:
m = 0.41, p = 0.041; subject J: m = 0.30, p = 0.0039; subject
K exhibited a non-signiﬁcant trend in the same direction:
m = 0.18, p = 0.081). Note that the preference for ﬂatness
within these sequences could be explained by the greater
decision weight placed upon later elements in the se-
quence (see Section 3.4), or possibly by a preference for
spreading (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993).
One possible explanation for the impact of peak values
on human retrospective evaluations of sequences is that
peak values are over-weighted in memory (Rozin, Rozin,0.005
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Fig. 5. Impact of position in sequence on upcoming valuation. Results of
regression of position against likelihood of choosing in the random
sequence variant of the task. Stimuli later in the sequence exhibit a
stronger effect on choice. Error bars indicate standard error (see
Section 2.3).& Goldberg, 2004). Such memory effects may be less
important in our task, where the decision occurs less than
a second after the end of the sequence. If so, then increas-
ing the working memory load of the task might increase
relative preference for peaked sequences. To test this idea,
we compared preferences for the same three sequences as
above ([22822], [23532], [24442]) in a weak working
memory challenge condition: the same task but with a
4 s delay between the end of the last reward in the probe
and the choice (Fig. 6B).
We found two effects of delay on preference. First, add-
ing a delay decreased overall preferences for the probe se-
quence. Second, and more relevant to our hypothesis,
monkeys showed a signiﬁcant preference for the peaked
sequence over the other two (bootstrap t-test, p = 0.001
for the group of animals, and p < 0.05 for each animal indi-
vidually). We observed no difference between preference
for [23532] and [24442] for either the group or the indi-
viduals (p = 0.84 for the group and p > 0.05 for each indi-
vidual). These results endorse the memory hypothesis of
peak preferences, and suggest that peak- and trend- prefer-
ences may be experimentally dissociable.4. Discussion
We used a novel decision-making task to study how
monkeys evaluate sequences of rewards. We found that
monkeys place more weight on items that occur later in a
sequence. These results mirror similar human results
showing biases for increasing sequences, and, like them,
challenge the validity of simple discounting models of
intertemporal choice (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donog-
hue, 2002; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991). Models of dis-
counting indicate that monkeys devalue future rewards
quite steeply and predict, in direct opposition to our data,
that monkeys should strongly prefer decreasing sequences
(Glimcher et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2008). These contradic-
tory ﬁndings are unlikely to reﬂect individual differences
in our monkeys as they, like most monkeys, exhibit steep
discounting as measured in standard intertemporal choice
tasks (Blanchard et al., 2013). Our data also indicate that
monkeys prefer sequences with prominent peak values, at
least when working memory is challenged. We know of
no study in humans or animals investigating the effects of
working memory challenge on peak preferences. Together,
these ﬁndings open the window to a deeper understanding
of the underlying mechanisms causing the peak bias.
One earlier study examined the sequence preference
patterns of rhesus monkeys (Xu et al., 2011). The major
ﬁnding of this study was that monkeys preferred decreas-
ing sequences of rewards, a ﬁnding that is directly opposite
of what we report here. We suspect the difference between
studies is due to factors of task design. Perhaps the largest
difference is the number of trials. That study used 30 trials
per day across three days for each of three monkey sub-
jects in the critical experiment (with an additional 10
familiarization trials), whereas we used at least 1000 train-
ing trials before we began collecting data. It is possible that
monkeys in that study failed to appreciate that choice of
the smaller reward would lead to a larger reward later
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Fig. 6. Inﬂuence of peak value on preference with and without working memory challenge. (A) Plot of value placed on each of three sequences with same
total value but different peak. Subjects prefer sequences with ﬂatter distribution of values. (B) Introducing a weak working memory challenge (a 4 s delay
after initial presentation of stimuli and before choice) induces a preference for peaked sequences. Error bars indicate standard error, as calculated by a
jackknife procedure (see Section 2.3).
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extinguished with more training. Indeed, we regularly ob-
serve random or biased preferences during the ﬁrst hun-
dred or so trials of training of all our tasks, and renewed
biases for the ﬁrst few dozen trials each day. Consistent
with this idea, the authors of that study performed four
control experiments and found somewhat inconsistent
results (effects in only two of the three monkeys, twice sig-
niﬁcant in the opposite direction in the third monkey) in
all of them. For example, experiment 4 in that study, which
sought to replicate Experiment 1 with different rewards,
found an end bias in one of the three subjects. Moreover,
Experiments 2 and 3, which asked subjects to choose
between pairs and singletons showed that one of the mon-
keys (different monkeys in 2 and 3) did not prefer the pair,
suggesting a possible failure to understand the task. Vari-
ous other differences in the studies may have helped to
produce these different results. For example, it is possible
that the use of a repetition design and the use of ﬁve
rewards instead of two led to a larger working memory
demand, and this elicited the bias (which some have sug-
gested is linked to memory; Fredrickson & Kahneman,
1993). Their task also included a greater inter-reward
interval (4 s vs 0.5 s), which may have made the causal
relationship between the rewards more difﬁcult to learn.
They also used rewards that differed in quality (and thus
along multiple dimensions simultaneously) instead of
quantity, which also may have made the task more difﬁcult
to learn. Finally, as our task was automated and had a
much greater number of trials, monkeys may have per-
ceived the task environment as more stable than they did
in the Xu study. As perceived stability of the environment
can inﬂuence temporal preferences in other contexts (e.g.
Kidd, Palmeri, & Aslin, 2013), it is plausible that the biases
we observe are sensitive to perceptions of environmental
stability. It is notable that the design of the Xu et al. is
much more similar to that of a standard intertemporal
choice task, and that their results are consistent with delay
discounting experiments.
4.1. General Implications
Our results show that, like humans, monkeys prefer
sequences with increasing values. Are the human andmonkey biases due to a common cause, or are the two facts
coincidental? Our data cannot answer this question deﬁn-
itively. Indeed, human sequence preference effects, which
are as diverse as they are ubiquitous, cannot be assigned
to the same causes with any certainty. For example, most
people prefer that their salary increase over their lifetime
(a preference that is not wealth maximizing) and also pre-
fer unpleasant noise bursts that diminish rather than grow
over the timescale of seconds to minutes (Loewenstein &
Prelec, 1993). These preferences may stem from a single
cause or may reﬂect differing impulses with common
results. Thus, we do not have a great understanding of
the reasons for human preferences for increasing
sequences. We therefore think it premature to argue that
monkey peak-end rule biases are the same as those
observed in humans, but instead simply that this class of
preferences should added to the list of heretofore
human-speciﬁc biases.
This does not mean we are entirely blind to the cogni-
tive factors that inﬂuence sequence biases in our task. In
the case of the present study, two factors appear to be par-
ticularly important. First, our results suggest that excessive
focus on more recent rewards (even on the timescale of
seconds) may cause monkeys to integrate past rewards in
a biased manner. Second, it appears that working memory
capacity may be a critical limiting factor that causes this
bias. Note that because working memory is limited to a
few minutes, it is unlikely to account for biases in retro-
spective evaluations of, say, hour-long colonoscopies six
months in the past (Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996). If
these possibilities are borne out by subsequent studies, it
would suggest that the key factor motivating choices in
this task is not a basic preference for increasing sequences,
but a perceptual/learning bias coupled with a preference
for larger sequences. To the extent that they support this
idea, the present results contribute to an emerging picture
of animals as canny decision makers that seek to optimize
but have speciﬁc bounds to their ability to choose utility
maximizing options (Bateson & Kacelnik, 1996; Blanchard
et al., 2013; Gigerenzer, 2002; Simon, 1955; Stephens,
2002; Stephens & Anderson, 2001).
An important debate in the literature on preferences for
sequences is whether we prefer increasing sequences or
sequences with large end values. Although the peak-end
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known and most widely cited account for such judgments
and choices, competing views have been repeatedly ex-
pressed, most notably by Ariely and his colleagues, who
stress that the slope or rate-of-change in addition of other
factors is the key determinant of preferences (Ariely, Kahn-
eman, & Loewenstein, 2000). In particular, in a comprehen-
sive analysis of the possible underlying determinants of
retrospective pain evaluations, Ariely (1998) showed that
importance of the pattern of experience including the
direction of change, the gradient of the slope, and the ﬁnal
intensity. His conclusion was that the direction of change
(trend), not the peak-end, in pain intensity is the single
best predictor of retrospective evaluations (for similar evi-
dence in the domain of satisfaction see Hsee & Abelson,
1991; Hsee et al., 1991). However, there remains a debate
about the relative contribution of trend (deﬁned as direc-
tion of change – worsening vs. improving) and the end spe-
ciﬁcally as determinants of preferences. We feel this to be
fuelled in part by the ﬂexibility of the peak-end rule – it de-
scribes a tendency for respondents to be inﬂuenced pri-
marily by these two characteristics (peak intensity and
end intensity), but does not specify that they must be
weighed equally (indeed, there have been reported exam-
ples of cases in which the end was more important, and
examples in which the peak was more important, as in
Fredrickson, 2000, p. 588). In line with previous work,
our data are more consistent with preferences for improv-
ing sequences (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993), because: (1)
the greatest increment to preference occurs when the most
valued element of the sequence moves from the ﬁrst to the
second position; (2) moving the most valued element to
the end has no special effect (and a weaker effect if any-
thing) than moving it later at some other point in the se-
quence (i.e., this is evidence against an speciﬁc ‘end
effect’); (3) we detect a peak effect only with a memory
challenge.
Another way of looking at our results is to consider the
similarities between sequences of rewards and multidi-
mensional rewards. It is well-established that humans
have difﬁculty integrating different dimensions of options
to calculate a single utility value (Tversky, 1972). Instead,
we generally use heuristic shortcuts, prioritizing certain
dimensions (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). In our
task, each step in the sequence is independent and thus
in some ways a different dimension. Here we ﬁnd that
monkeys prioritize the more recent rewards in evaluating
sequences of options, suggesting that they, like humans,
prioritize certain dimensions, perhaps to reduce cognitive
load. As far as we are aware, monkeys’ proclivity for
dimensional prioritization in standard multi-attribute
choice tasks remains unstudied.
4.2. Challenge to temporal discounting models
Animal psychologists have long used delay discounting
tasks to investigate intertemporal preferences (Ainslie,
1975; Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 1994; Mazur, 1987;
McDiarmid & Rilling, 1965; Rachlin, 2004). It has been
repeatedly shown that animals prefer smaller sooner
rewards to larger later ones, and that preferences can bedescribed by a hyperbolic (or sometimes exponential) de-
cay curve (Kim et al., 2008; Mazur, 1987). Typically, ani-
mals are found to discount half of a reward’s value in 1–
5 s (Stephens & Anderson, 2001). These results apply
across multiple taxa, including rhesus monkeys, apes, pi-
geons, rats and even guppies (Mühlhoff, Stevens, & Reader,
2011; Rosati, Stevens, Hare, & Hauser, 2007).
The results of the present study cannot be explained
using discounting approaches. Monkeys’ preferences for
increasing sequences would require negative discount fac-
tors, which have never been observed in the animal king-
dom. This possibility is unlikely because our monkeys
exhibit garden-variety positive discount factors as mea-
sured by standard intertemporal choice tasks (Blanchard
et al., 2013). Negative discount factors would also make
no evolutionary sense because they would lead to a prefer-
ence for inﬁnite waiting.
We see three possible interpretations for this discrep-
ancy between intertemporal choice preferences and se-
quence preferences. First, monkeys may discount strongly
in our reward repeat task, but other factors may outweigh
the steep discounting. If so, this would suggest that dis-
counting can be easily outweighed and counteracted by
other psychological biases, and would challenge its gener-
ality and thus its utility as a metric for preferences (Pear-
son et al., 2010). Second, monkeys’ steep discounting
may be limited to certain contexts, such as the intertempo-
ral choice task including single outcomes, and lack predic-
tive validity in other contexts (Stephens & Anderson,
2001). Third, speciﬁc design factors in intertemporal choice
tasks may provide a misleadingly large reading of animals
true discount factors, and animals do not actually discount
rewards substantially on the order of seconds.
We favor the third explanation. We and others have
previously argued that animals exhibit a bound on their
ability to process post-reward delays in delay discounting
tasks, and this bound may explain the apparent extreme
discounting values often found using these tasks (Blan-
chard et al., 2013; Pearson et al., 2010; Stephens, 2002).
Moreover, animals fail to show steep discounting in natu-
ralistic foraging-like tasks, challenging the validity of inter-
temporal choice measures (Stephens & Anderson, 2001;
Stevens & Stephens, 2008). The present study, which unlike
intertemporal choice tasks uses an experiential cue, will
necessarily reduce any ambiguity about post-reward de-
lays, and thus provides additional evidence that discount
factors lack external validity.
4.3. Future directions
The present results raise several important questions.
How general are the patterns we observe here? Are they
fully explainable due to limitedmemory or are other effects
important? How similar are they do the effects observed in
humans? What factors cause these biases and what factors
cause the reverse? Do working memory effects in our task
relate to putative long-termmemory effects in similar tasks
with longer delays? We only tested for end-biases with a
short delay (0.5 s) between the initial probe presentation
and choice, but it is possible that a longer one may elicit a
different pattern of biases. Indeed, different delay lengths
298 T.C. Blanchard et al. / Cognition 130 (2014) 289–299have been found to affect recall biases in animal working
memory tasks (Wright, Santiago, & Sands, 1984). Future
work could investigate if this pattern holds true in prefer-
ence tasks such as ours as well. It remains unclear whether
these results will extend tomore complex types of rewards,
such as intrinsically rewarding sensory cues (Blatter &
Schultz, 2006; Deaner, Khera, & Platt, 2005;Watson & Platt,
2012) or longer-duration experiences. Finally, we are curi-
ous to know what neural processes lead to these particular
patterns of preferences for rewards.
Acknowledgements
We thank Marc Mancarella, Mariah Meyer, Meghan
Castagno, Evan Alter, and Alberto Sepulveda for help in
data collection. We thank John Pearson (Duke University)
for help with statistics. This research was supported by a
K99/R00 from the NIH (DA027718) and a Sloan Foundation
fellowship to BYH.
Appendix A. Basic methods
In each session, the animal was transported from the
colony at the University of Rochester to the testing room,
about 100 feet away in the same building. The testing room
was built speciﬁcally for primate studies and houses a
computer screen and ﬂoor plate for ﬁrm mounting of the
ergonomically designed primate chair (Crist). Animals
made all task-relevant decisions using gaze shifts to se-
lected targets. Horizontal and vertical eye positions were
sampled at 1000 Hz by an infrared eye-monitoring camera
system (SR Research, Osgoode, ON). Stimuli were con-
trolled by a computer running Matlab (Mathworks, Natick,
MA) with Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997) and Eyelink Tool-
box (Cornelissen, Peters, & Palmer, 2002).
A standard solenoid valve controlled the duration of
water delivery (Parker). We measured ﬂuid volumes asso-
ciated with solenoid open time in order to ensure that ﬂuid
amounts were linearly proportional to the values in-
structed by the program. We conﬁrmed that water delivery
volume was constant regardless of the volume of water in
the reservoir over the ranges used in this experiment. Fluid
access was controlled outside of experimental sessions.
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